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NOTES.
ILLEGALITY OF UNIFORiM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE UNDER
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT.-With the advent of national

advertising by manufacturers and producers the question of resale
price maintenance has become one of considerable importance. The
problem is a comparatively recent one. It has only become a problem since the establishment by national advertising of so-called
"national brands." Can a manufacturer by any lawful means control the resale prices of his goods so as to secure uniform resale
prices? It should be noted that the question is not one as regards
*The Board of Editors regrets the resignation of Thomas McConnell, III,
an Associate Editor, on account of illness.
(198)
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the control of prices by a monopoly control of the production of a
certain commodity. It concerns merely the price maintenance of a
certain brand of goods of a particular commodity by the individual
producer in a competitive field.' In a recent case the question was
again presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for
consideration.2 The Beech-Nut Packing Company set certain uniform prices for the sale of its products by both wholesalers and
retailers. These prices were maintained by co-operation and common understanding, but without any express agreement or contract.
The penalty of non-compliance with the prices was an inability to
secure from any jobber or from the Company itself any more of
its products. The Company maintained a very effective system of
surveillance to secure a compliance with these resale prices. The
result was that the Beech-Nut Packing Company actually controlled
and dictated the resale prices of its products. The Federal Trade
Commission, by virtue of the authority given it by Congress,3 sought
aiinjunction to restrain the defendant company from any further
enforcement of this system. The Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Second Circuit refused an injunction.4 On appeal, by a five to four
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and-held in
effect that this system violated The Federal Trade Commission Act '
in that it tended to hinder and stifle competition and was as a consequence "unfair competition."
In i908, in the case of Bobbs--Merrill Co. v. Strauss,' the
Supreme Court for the first tirhe questioned the right of a producer
to control resale prices. The publishers of a copyrighted book
printed in each book a condition of sale, which provided that it could
be resold only at a stipulated price, and that any violation of the
condition would be an infringement of the copyright. The court
held that such condition was ineffecrial in the absence of any contract or license agreement, and did not constitute an infringement
For example, the question is not where A has a monopoly of shoes

and controls the price through his monopoly of supply. The question is one

where A, B, and C manufacture shoes in competition with one another. Can
-A dictate the resale price at which his particular 'make of shoes will be resold?
'Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 42 Sup." Ct. Isa

(xg ).

S 3 8 Stat. at Large, ch. 3i1, se.
5. "The commission is hereby empowered
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks,
and common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce; from using
unfair methods of competition in commerce."
'Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 885 (C.

C. A. igao).
'Note 3, supra.
2To U. S. 339, 52 L Ed. To86 (T9o8).
Keine, 2o2 Fed. 225 (D. C 1913).

Accord: Waltham Watch Co. v.
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of the complainant's copyright. In Bauer v. O*Donnell the same
rule was laid down in regard to patented articles. In this case the
manufacturer had attached to the article a license to sell only at a
fixed price. The court held that a subsequent retail "cut price" sale
did not violate any of the complainant's rights under the patent laws
and that the notice was in no way binding upon the retailer. It will
thus be seen that the attachment of a "license" to sell only at a stipulated price is ineffective, both as to copyrighted and patented articles,
to secure uniform resale prices.
Such being the case, can the manufacturer secure uniform
resale prices by means of express contracts and agreements? In
Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,' the legality of such contracts was squarely presented to the court for decision. The'
Supreme Court held that these contracts violated the Sherman Act'
in that they constituted a restraint of trade. Such contracts, says
the court in another case,'( constitute an effort to "destroy the
dealer's independent discretion through restrictive agreements."
A later case, U. S. v. Colgate & Co.," threw considerable doubt
upon the question. The defendant was indicted for violation of
the Sherman Act." It was alleged that if a dealer did not sell the
defendant's goods at the price fixed by it, the defendant would not
resell to that dealer. The dealer was free to cut prices on the goods
he had. but the penalty was a failure to secure any more goods from
the defendant. The court held that the indictment did not charge
'229 U. S. x, 57, L Ed. 1o41
(1913).
Previous to this decision as a
result of Bement v. National Narrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 46 L. Ed. xo58
(1902), the lower Federal courts had held that the "license" was effective in
the case of patented articles. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123
Fed. 424 (C. C. 103); National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed. 733
(C. C. i9o4); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. -. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 54Fed. 358 (C. C. 19o7); Automatic Pencil Sharpener Co. v. Goldsmith Bros.,

19o Fed. 205 (C. C. 19I1).

.220 U. S. 373, 55 L Ed. 502 (i91i). In this case the retailers were compelled to sign a contract agreeing to sell the gdods only at the price fixed by
the complainant. The signing of the contract was made a condition precedent to the ability to secure any of the complainant's goods.
Prior to the Miles Co. case, the legality of these contracts had been
passed upon by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit. Park &
Sons Co. v. Hartmen, 153 Fed. 23 (C. C. i9o7). The court held the contracts
illegal. To quote in part from that opinion, "All roem for competition between retailers, who supply the public, is made impossible. If these contracts
leave any room at any point of the line for the usual play of competition between the dealers in the product marketed by complainant, it is not discoverable. Thus a combination between the manufacturer, the wholesalers and
the retailers to maintain prices and stifle competition has been brought abouL"
'Act of July 2, 18o, c. 647,526 Stat. 20.
"U. S. v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920).
"250 U. S. 30D, 63 1- Ed. 992 (1919).
nNote 9, jupra.

NOTES
the defendant with any violation of the Sherman Act.13 This
decision was construed by a lower court 4 as holding that a manufacturer could enforce uniform resale prices so long as there was
no express agreement and that the rule of Miles Medical Co. v. Park
& Sons '" applied only to express agreements and contracts.. On
appeal '6the Supreme Court repudiated any such interpretation of
U. S. v. Colgate & Co." The only question decided was one of
pleadings, in view of the interpretation put upon the indictment by
the lower court. The question of implied agreements, it said, was
in no way brought up or touched upon. The Miles Co. case 15 was
not intended to be modified in any manner. The question,- therefore, of "implied agreements" and "tacit understandings" was still
undetermined. This question was. presented for consideration in
the principal case.
Can the manufacturer secure the result of uniform resale prices
through "tacit understanding" and "mutual co-operation," which the
Miles Co. case 9 had prohibited in the case of express agreements?
The court answers the question in the negative. It is the effort
to fix prices that is illegal. The means are not the determining
factor. It is the policy of "price fixing" and price maintenance
that the law condemns and prohibits. It is the policy of the law to
prohibit price maintenance by a manufacturer, and any means
adopted to secure that result is equa!ly ineffective.
It is submitted that the underlying basis of the entire question
of price maintenance is an economic one, one of public policy. .The
Sherman Act2 0 prohibits agreements in restraint of trade. The
Federal Trade Commission Act 21 'authorizes the prevention of
"unfair competition." These acts are fundamentally statements of
public policy. That public policy and interest the court has construed as being the right to have every sale transaction of any charNote 9, jupra.
4U. S. v. A. Schrader's Sons Inc., 264 Fed.

x75 (D. C. igg). It is

interesting to note that the lower court in the principal case put exactly the
same interpretation upon the Colgate case. See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v.

Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 885 (C. C.
u Note 8, supt.

192o).

"Note io,.supra. In referring to the Colgate cwL. ..c court said, "We
had no intention to overrule or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons, where the effort was to destroy the dealers' independent discretions through restrictive agreements. Under the interpretation adopted by
the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, the indictment failed to charge
that Colgate & Company made agreements, either express or implied, which
undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified resale prices."

"1Note
, Note
"Note
ONbte
, Note

xx, jupra.
8, .supr.
8, supra.
9, oup
3, supra.
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acter free from all elements of control as far as price maintenance
is concerned so that the public may secure the benefits of unrestricted competition. As Mr. Justice Hughes says,. "Because there
is monopoly of production, it certainly cannot be said that there is
no public inteiest in maintaining freedom of trade with respect to
future sales after the article has been plcaed on the market and the
producer has parted with his title.".22 The controlling public interest
is to have unrestricted competition, free from all price control.
In the Miles ..Medical Co. case, - Mr. Justice Holmes, in his
dissent, questioned the proposition that public interest demanded the
elimination of price maintenance and uniform resale prices. To
quote, "I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance
to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an
article, as fixing a fair prici. What really fixes that is the competition of conflicting desires.

.

.

.

As soon as the price of some-

thing that we want goes above the point at which we are willing to
give up other things to have that, we cease to buy it and buy some. . I cannot believe that in the long run the public
thing elsewill profit by this court permitting knaves to- cut reasonable prices
for some ulterior putrpose of their own and thus to impair, if not to
destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be
desirable that the public should be able to get" 2 ' This fairly represents the position of the advocates of price maintenance. The
manufacturer's interest does follow the article to the ultimate customer. It is to his interest to see that the retailer secures a fair
profit so that he will continue to handle the article. It is to protect
the manufacturer from the consequences of 'price cutting by retailers
that price maintenance is sought.2 5 The legality of all uniform
resale price agreements should be their reasonableness. In England 2 and in some states 2 this view of the question has been taken
and price maintenance upheld 2u
= Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 313, at page 403.
" Note 8, .supra.
" 220 U. S. 373 (i9i1), at page 412.
'See an article by Mr. Justice Brandeis, then a member of the bar, ini
Harper's Weekly for November 15, 1913, entitled "Cut-throat Prices-The
Competition That Kills."
"Elliman Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Sons [igoi] 2 Ch. Div. 275; National Phonograph Co. v. Edison-Bell Co. [io8] x Ch. Div. 335; Ford
Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 3o Times Law R. 4oo (1914); Dunlop Tyre Co. v.
New Garage Co. [19i5] A. C. 79.
"Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. io4i (1912); Fisher
Flour Milling Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144 (1913).
" For two very able articles advocating this view see: "The Maintenance
of Uniform Resale. Prices" by Charles L Miller, 63 U. of P. Law Rev. 22;
"Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade," by Edward S. Rogers, 27 Har.
Law Rev. .139.

NOTES

It will be noticed that the Federal Trade Commission is
empowered to prevent "'unfair competition." 2P And it is upon the
theory that the price maintenance plan of the Beech-Nut Packing
Co. constituted "'unfair competition," that it was held illegal in the
principal zase. The minority of the court denied that there was
any question of competition at all involved.31 The majority of the
court held, however, in substance that fair competition meant unrestricted competition and therefore ainy hindrance of such competition
was ':unfair competition" within the meaning of the Act.
As a result of the Beech-Nut Packing Co. case 11 it would seem
that the Supreme Court would hold all forms of contracts, agredments or arrangements, having for their object the regulation and
maihtenhnce of uniform resale prices illegal and unenforceable.
P. A. M.
INTOXICATING L1QUOR AS A SUBJECT OF LARCENY UNDER THE

VOLSTEAD Ac.-It must be admitted that "prohibition" has not
met with the unanimous approval of the people of the United States,
but that, on the other hand, there is a certain element of lawlessness
present, as evidenced by numerous newspaper accounts of daring
raids and housebreakings for the purpose of illegally carrying away
intoxicating liquors. It is much to be desired that the criminal
liability for such offenses should be definitely fixed.
It has been decided in a recent case I that intoxicating liquor
manufactured since January 20, 1921, for beverage purposes, is not

the subject of larceny. The theory upon which the court seems to
proceed is that under the Volstead Act 2 intoxicating liquors manufactured in violation of law are not property 8 and, hence, are not
to be protected as such.
Note 3. s'upra.
"Mr. Justice Holmes delivered a dissenting opinion, concurred in by
Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Brandeis. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered a separate dissenting opinion. To quote fro'm Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion. "The ground on which the respondent is held guilty is that its conduct has a dangerous tendency, unduly to hinder competition or to create
monopoly. It is enough to say that this I cannot understand. . . . I cannot see how it is unfair competition to say to those to whom the respondent
sells and to the world you can have my goods only on the terms that I propose when the existence of any competition in dealing with them depends
upon the respondent's [Packing Company's] will. I see no wrong in so doing, and if I did I should not think it a wrong within the possible scope of
the word unfair. Many unfair devices have been exposed in suits under the
Sherman Act, but to whom the respondent's conduct is unfair, I do not understand."
'Note 2, Supa.
1
People v. Spencer, 2oi Pac. 130 (Cal. i9g).
'National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305).
' Title II, Sec. 25, reads in part as follows: "It shall be unlawful to have
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While it is not clear from the wording just what is the meaning of the provisions of the Volstead Act with respect to property
rights, judicial interpretation I has cleared up this difficulty to some
extent so that it may now safely be said that "the mere possession
of liquor in and of itself does not constitute a crime, and it can
only he seized when it is held in defiance of the provisions of the
Volstead Act. .
If this be the true interpretation of Section 25 of the Volstead
Act, 6 how was there any violation in the principal case? 7 The
inforniation there concerned liquor which had been manufactured
since January 20, 1921, for beverage purposes. This was, of course,
a violation of the Volstead Act,8 but it is only in section 25 ' that
there is reference to property rights, and that section says there shall
be no property rights in "liquor . . . intended for. use in violating this title or which has been so used
.
." It nowhere
aplars in the principal case that the liquor, as then possessed, was
intended for use in violation of law; and it can hardly be said that,
mwrely because manufacture for beverage purposes is illegal, this
liquor "has been so used" within the meaning of section 25, for at
the time of manufacture the liquor was not in existehce.
Whenever the ownership of liquor is questioned, the burden is
on the possessor to prove that his possession is legal,' 0 but the
learned judge who decided the instant case could hardly have gone
upon the theory that this makes possession prima facie a possession
with intent to violate the law, so as to bring the facts of the case
within section 25, for it would be unique to put the burden of proof
on one who is not a party to the case.
The purpose of the Volstead Act is the prevention of the use
of intoxicating liquor as a beverage, and all its provisions are to be
liberally construed to this end.11 Is it possible, then, that section 25
or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this title or which has been so used, and no
property right shall exist in any such liquor or property."
'United States v. Turner, 266 Fed. 248, 252 (D. C. I92o); Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U. S.88, 91 (ig2o).
'In re Horschler, i6 Misc. Rep. 243. 248; i9o N. Y. S. 355, 358 (xg2).
' See Note 3, supra.
'See Note i, supra.
'Title II, See. 3: "No person shall on or after the date when the.
eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into
effect, manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish
or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this Act...
'See Note 3, .supra.
"Title II, Sec. 33: ".
.
. the burden of proof shall be upon the possessor in an action concerning the same to prove that such liquor was lawfully acquired, possessed and used."
'Title II, See. 3: "- . . . and all the provisions of this Act shal be
liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented."

NOTES

was intended to mean that, as there should be no property rights in
articles which have been used in the "manufacture of liquor intended
for use in violating this title," therefore the finished product, the
liquor itself, being only the combination of articles of property
which have been used in the manufacture, comes equally within the
meaning of the provision and cannot be the subject of property
rights? The information specifically- sets out that the liquor was
manufactured for beverage purposes, which is in violation of the
Volstead Act, 12 so, if this construction of section 25 is upheld, there

is no doubt but that the court in the principal case was dealing with
"property" "which has been so used" in "the manufacture of liquor
intended for use in violating this title."
This would bring the case squarely within the wording of section 25, but it is hard to justify such an interpretation, for the very
wording of the section indicates that "liquor" and "property designed for the manufacture of liquor" are two entirely separate and
distinct things. Therefore, when certain articles are taken and
manufactured into liquor, the finished product, within the meaning
of the Volstead Act, is not property which has bein used in the
manufacture of liquor, but simply "liquor." Property rights still
exist in this liquor so that it may be the subject of larceny, unless
it is possessed with the intention of using it in violation of law, or
until it has been so used. So where it appears only that the liquor
in question was manufactured for beverage purposes-which is the
only fact present in the principal case-then property rights aie
forfeited only as to those articles which remain after the liquor

has been manufactured; i. c., the instruments used, as a still. The
13
liquor itself, though contraband, is still the subject of larceny, for
25.
section
it is not within
Furthermore, it is, to say the least, doubtful how the interpretation of section 25 which hag been suggested is possible under the
opinion of the court in the principal case,1' and the decision is
"See Note 8, supra.
"See Note 6, infra.
" People v. Spencer, 2oi Pac. i3o (Cal. i92r). "It is obvious that there

cannot be under the law as it exists today in this country an ownership of intoxicating liquors manufactured for beverage purposes since the enactment
of the Volstead Act, and manifestly, if there cannot be an ownership of such
liquors, they cannot be in legal contemplation property. It necessarily follows that the charge of larceny cannot be predicated of the act of taking
intoxicating liquors by one from the possession of another." (Per Hart, J., in
the above case.) The learned judge cited as authority the case of People v.
Caridis, 29 Cal. App. 166, 154 Pac. io6i (1915), which decided that a lottery
ticket, being only evidence of an obligation which existed in defiance of law,
had no validity in the eye of the law and so could not be the subject of grand:
larceny. Granting that larceny cannot be committed of an article which his
neither intrinsic nor artificial value; State v' Bryant, 4 N. C. 249 (185); it
does not follow that an article has no intrinsic value merely because deprived by law of its market value. The actual value remains and the article

2o6
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further questioned by the fact that, under this very same Volstead
Act, it has been held that intoxicating liquor may be the subject of
larceny without proof that the owner had a government permit to
possess it." Reference, however, was not made to section 25.
It is well settled that articles may be the subject of larceny,
notwithstanding they are illegal or contraband 16 so that no court
would aid the guilty owner in recovering his illegal articles. " 7 To
hold otherwise would be to run the hazard of encouraging larceny.ls
No case, however, with the exception of People v. Wilson,"'
has been decided under a statute similar to the provision contained
in section 25 of the Volstead Act. Definitions of larceny are in
entire accord to the effect that the subject of larceny must be the
"personal goocd of another." 20 Therefore, if the learned judge is
correct in saying that, under section 25, there could be no property
rights in the liquor' in question, the conclusion is inevitable that it
was not the subject of larceny.
While admitting the supremacy of the legislature in ordering
the summary destruction of property of trifling value, when such
action is necessary to effect the object of a valid law, 2 the deprivation of property rights in this particular instance is such a dangerous
innovation,. in view of the irreconcilable and admittedly unlawful
attitude of a large number of citizens whose views are hostile to the
purposes of the eighteenth- amendment to the Constitution of the
United States,22 that section 25, in so fa- as it relates to property
may be the subject of larceny. This doctrine is recognized even in California, and in the very case cited by the learned judge the court expressly
says: "Considered as a mere piece of paper the lottery ticket in question
possessed perhaps some slight intrinsic value, which, however small, would
have sufficed to make the wrongful taking of it petit larceny." It is a matter
of common knowledge that since liquor has been deprived of its market
value its intrinsic value has increased -in a remarkable degree.
'People v. Wilson, 20S -I!. 257, 131 N. E. 6og (I92i).
"August v. State ix Ga. App. 798, 76 S. - 164 (1912); State v. Sago,
i6i Iowa 7i, 14o N. W. 802 (1913); State v. Donovan, io8 Wash. ;76, 183
Pac. 127 (199); People v. Wilson, 298 Ill. 257, 131 N. E. 609 (1i92).
" Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 10 (1848) ; O'Connor v. Potter, 276 Fed. 32
(D. C. 121).
'Commonwealth v. Coffee, 9 Gray 139 (Mass. 1857); Bales v. State, 3
685 (1868).
NV.. Va.
"298 Ill 257, 131 NL B. 6og (i92). The law of Oklahoma
deprives the
unlawful possessor of property rights in intoxicating liquors only in a proceeding brought by the State to confiscate then. Amer v. State, iW7 Pac. 710
(Okla. i92).
" 2 East P. C. chap. x6, par. 2; 4 BL. Com. 230.
" Lawton v. Steele, iS5z U. S. 133, 38 L Ed. 385 (1893); 22 Op.. Atty.Gen. 71 (18W).
= Section i. "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."

NOTES
rights, should be interpreted in the light of the maxim that "statutes

in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed."
The Volstead Act makes no provision for the destruction of
any property seized by officers of the law, except under order of
court.2 3

If, therefore, officers of the law may not deprive a person

summarily of his property, it seems strange indeed that the same
Act should sanction this very action when done by an individual for
personal gain.
Also it is hard to see how the declaring of intoxicating liquors

to be not the subject of larceny can have any tendency to prevent
their use as a beverage, which is the declared pu'rpose of the Volstead Act.2 It is submitted that in any civilized and enlightened
community quiet and peaceful possession should be protected,2 5
certainly in so far as that can possibly be done without plainly
violating the express will of the Legislature. Then 'would it not be a
rational solution, greatly facilitating the administration of justice, if,
on a charge of larceny, once the State has proved the various elements of the charge, the burden of proof were put on the defendant
to show that the liquor in question was intended for use in violation
of the Volstead Act or had been so used? Certainly the presumption
of innocence should extend to the person who has suffered from
the unlawful act of the defendant. There is no hardship in this, fur
if the defendant can produce no evidence to sustain this burden of
proof, then it becomes evident that he acted being fully aware of
the fact that he might be committing larceny.
Section 26: "...
The court upon conviction of the perison so arrested shall order the liquor destroyed. . . ." Section 27 provides that it
may be delivered to government departments or sold to authorized purchasers, upon application of the United States attorney.
"See Note ix, .supra.
'There is no doubt but that liquor "manufactured since January 20, i92,
for beverage purposes," as was charged in the information in the principai
case, constitutes illegally acquired property. The following quotation is, therefore, in point: "If, looking beyond the mere question of property, we pass to
considerations of public policy . . . it is not easy to conceive anything,
which would more seriously embarrass the public ministers of justice, and obstruct its administration, than if it were held that any element of illegality
in the acquisition of property rendered it incapable of being the subiect
of larceny, and if, as a consequence, the necessity followed, in every case, to
go into the inquiry how the party complaining acquired the property.
"As to the latter point, . . . of the alternative moral and social

evils, which is the greater,-to deprive property unlawfully acquired of all

protection as such, and thus to discourage unlawful acquisition but encourage
larceny; or to punish, and so discourage larceny, though at the possible risk
of thus omitting so far forth to discourage unlawful acquisition? The balance of public policy, if we thus attempt to estimate the relative weight of
alternative evils, requires, it seems to us, that the larceny should be punished.
Each violation of law is to be dealt with by itself. The felonious taking has
its appropriate and specific punishment; so also has the unlawful acquisition."
Per Cushing, J., in Commonwealth v. Rourke, io Cush. 397 (Mass. z852), at
page 401.
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The learned Judge in the principal case suggests that the district
attorney might have named the property stolen as being the bottles
or other vessels in which the liquor was contained. It is interesting
to note that at common law a corpse could not be stolen,2 but that
larceny could be committed in respect of the shroud,' 7 or of the
2
coffin ;28 and also that dogs were not the subject of larceny, 9
although there seems to have been no objection to an indictment for
stealing the collar of the (log. Are we in this day to be driven to a
similar subterfuge? Such action would seem possible under the
present wording of Section 25 of the Volstead Act.
R.W.T.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF P.RFORMANCE AS A

DEFENSE

FOR

BREACH

down
in the famous case of Paradine v. Jane,' many courts both in
England and America arrived at some absurd results. 2 The influence of this decision is unquestionably evident in a few of the Pennsylvania cases, but, on the whole, it has not been allowed to lead the
courts to conclusions inconsonant with "the dictates of sound business and sound sense."
In Pollard v. Schafer,1 the earliest case on the subject of impossibility of performance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
A. had covenanted, inter alia, to deliver up certain premises, after
a term, in good repair. In an action by the covenantee, A. set up
the defense that the British Army had taken possession, committed
the waste complained of, and had continued in possession after the
end of the term. It was held that A. was not liable for the nonperformance of the agreement. Chief Justice M'Kean assigned
three reasons for his conclusion :4 first, because a covenant to perform despite an act of God or an enemy ought to be special and
OF CONTRACT IN PENNSYLVANIA.-In following the rule laid

"Corven's Case, Trinity Term, 12 Co. Rep. x05, note C (Evg.1612); 2
BI. Com. 429.
" Hayness Case, Leicester Assizes, 12 Co. Rep. 113 (Eng. 1577).
2 East P. C. 65o (Eng.).
' Findlay v. Bear, 8 S. & R. 57x (Pa. 1822) ; State v. Lyn-us, 26 Ohio 4oo
(1875).
'Alleyn 26 (Eng. 1647). The rule contained therein has been stated to
be, that where the law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to
perform it without any default over, and hath no remedy over, there the law
will excuse him; but when the party by his own contract creates a duty or
charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding
any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against
it by his contract. However, that the question of impossibility of performance was not involved in that case, see 19x6 (F.) L. R. A. 1S.
'For a few of the outstanding ones, see 66 U. oF PA. LAW Rgv., 28
(1917).
t1 Dallas 210 (Pa. 1787).
p. 215.

NOTES

express, and so clear that no other meaning could be put upon it;
secondly, the defendant had no consideration for this risk and it
was not in the contemplation of either party; thirdly, because it is

5
This last statement was
more just that the loss should be divided.
approved in the briefly reported case of Iluling 'v. Craig," a few
-years later.
To the early strict rule which was that in no case would impossibility be regarded as an excuse for the non-performance of a
contract, there grew up several exceptions. These "crept into the
law, not as excuses, but under the cover of implied conditions." '
This statement is scarcely applicable to the Pennsylvania cases, since
the exceptions here arose, for the most part, upon the clear grounds
of common sense and the furtherance of justice.
The exceptions, as now adopted in Pennsylvania, are, in general,
those recognized universally. A defense is admitted where performance has been prevented by the death or sickness of one of the
parties, by a new law forbidding the act contracted for, and by an
accidental destruction of some thing essential to performance. In
addition to these generally accepted views, the Pennsylvania courts
have also allowed, as a defense, impossibility resulting from acts of
the other party to the contract."
Under the first exception, namely, impossibility because of the
death or sickness of one of the parties, it is necessary to distinguish

between contracts which are personal in nature and those which are
not. In the former case, the promisor will be discharged upon death
or sickness. Once the court finds that the parties intended the relation to be a purely personal one, it will usually declare as a corollary,
unless the contrary is expressly stipulated, that the parties did not
intend to bind their executors or administrators.9 But, on the other
hand, "where a party agrees to do that which does not necessarily
require him to perform in person, that which he may, by assignment
of his contract or otherwise, employ others to do, we may fairly
infer, unless otherwise expressed, that a mere personal relation was
not contemplated." 20

By this he meant that the lessee should lose the temporary profits of the
premises and the lessor should bear the loss done the permanent buildings.
* Addison w42 (Pa. 1797): "It must be impossibility, not difficulty, that
will excuse from performance of a contract. If complete performance becomes impossible from a cause not within the power of man to control, the
loss ought perhaps to be divided."
'x5 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 64 (i9ox).'Seipel v. International Life Insurance Co., 84 Pa. 47 (x87); Gast v.
Miller, 2 W. N. C. 361 (Pa. 1876).
' Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 47 AtL 289 (igoo) ; Carr v. Lowry's Administrators, 27 Pa. 257 (1856); Bland's Administrators v. Umstead, 23 Pa.
317 0354); Dickinson v. Calahan's Administrators, ig Pa. 227 (i852).
"Billing's Appeal, 1o6 Pa. SA 56o (1884).
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The second exception provides for the defense of what may be
called legal impossibility since, in most cases, performance is still
possible if the promisor wishes to break the law.11 "The law never
exacts performance of a contract where performance would involve
violation of the law." 12 On the subject of injunctions and judicial
orders which render performance legally impossible, the law is not
so settled.13
As to the third exception, the attitude of the Pennsylvania
courts may well be shown by a quotation from Orlady, Justice, in
Dixon v. Brcon:1 4 "In regard to such a contract each party must
reasonably be expected to take into consideration the possibility of
the demolition of the subject-matter of the contract without incorporating any provision in regard to it in the writing." 15 A still
more liberal view was taken in the case of Ward v. Vance, 8 where
A. was excused from his promise to furnish water through certain
pipes, by virtue of the fact that a drought dried up the spring."
IHowever, it must be clear that the destruction renders performance
of the contract impossible and not merely more difficult and expensive.' 8 In contracts for the sale of specific goods, a total destruction will avoid the contract under the Sales Act."9
Illegality, as such, cannot be set up as a defense, because there was no
defect in the origina! contract and no fault on the part of the plaintiff.
" Monoca Borough v. Monoca Street Railway, 247 Pa. 242,.247, 93 At.
344 (i9x5). The true ground of this case, however, was that the duty was
one not assumed by the company, but created by law.
33 Williston, Contracts, Sec. z939 (i92o).
In Pennsylvania, where the
injunction does not render the act contracted for ultra vires, the promisor can
recover for work done before the granting of the injunction. Harlow v. Borough of Beaver Falls, 188 Pa. 263, 41 At. 533 (1898). But where the promisor
knew that he would have to rely on the co-operation of the municipality in
order to do what he had promised, and he is prevented by injunction from
performing, he cannot set this up as defense, for the reason that "he should
have taken that into consderation when he made the contract." Bradley v. McHale, ig Pa. Super. Ct 30o (1902).
"22 Pa. Super. Ct. 340, 347 (9o3).
In this case, the broad rule is laid
down, that "where a contract is entered into of a continuing character or to
be performed at a future time dependent upon the continued existence of a
particular person or thing, or the continuing ability of the obligor to perform. subsequent death, destruction or disability will excuse the obligor from
compliance with the terms of the contract."
"This does seem to be based on the idea of an implied condition, which
is criticised in z5 Harv. L Rev. 418 (19o2).
'93 Pa. 499 (188o).
""He did not agree to furnish water in case drought dried that spring."
Trunkey, J. This statement would almost give unlimited sway to the doctrine
of impossibility of performance as a good defense.
"'Gillou v. Toudy, 5 W. N. C. 528 (Pa. I878).
"Sec. 8 (r). See also Sec. 8 (2) for situation where goods are p-rtially destroyed.

NOTES

A number of cases have recently arisen calling upon the courts
to decide whether impossibility of performance due to the war is a
good defense. In two recent Pennsylvania cases,20 it was sought to
raise this question, but in both instances judgment was given for
want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. The Court, speaking
through 'Mr. Justice Simpson, -1 said that the affidavits of defense,
fairly interpreted, asserted nothing beyond mere difficulty of performance, whether impossibility of performance, was construed to
mean absolute impossibility, or "commercial impracticability." It is
well settled thLt the mere existence of a state of war, in the absence
of a stipulation against liability, is no excuse for a breach of contract, regardless of the increase in expense or difficulty of performance which it entails. 22 Exceptions to this rule have been recognized
in contracts of employment between masters of vessels and seamen, 2S and also where the owner of a ship, on the outbreak of war
or when war appeared to be imminent, failed to proceed on a voyage, fearing capture.2 4 But where it clearly appears that, because
of war, the contract has become legally or physically impossible of
performance, there is authority for saying that this would be a good
defense.25 Although there are no Pennsylvania cases on the subject,
in the light of the other decisions on impossibility of performance
and considering the reasoning of other courts which have allowed,
as a defense, impossibility of performance due to war, it may safely
be said that, if the affidavit of defense states with sufficient exactitude the conditions which are responsible for the impossibility and
shows that these conditions are the proximate cause of the failure
to perform and, finally, that the war was not in the -contemplation Of
the parties at the time of contract, it will be a good defense in this
jurisdictior.
By a careful and chronological reading of the Pennsylvania
cases dealing with supervening impossibility as an excuse for nonperformaice, it will be found that the following views have been
"'Comm. v. Neff et al.,27i Pa. 312, 1I4 Atl. 267 (i92); Comm. v. Bader,
Pa. 38, 14 AtL 266 (ig90).
n pp. 31o and 314.
" Vellore S. S. Co. v. Steengrafe, 29 Fed. 394, 143 C. C. A. 514 (x916);
Richards v. Wreschner, 156 N. Y. S. ioS4 (1915); see also Crawford v. Willing, 4 Dallas. 286 (Pa. 1803.).
"The Epsom, 227 Fed. i.8 (D. C. zgS).
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"The Kronprinzessin Cedlle, 244 U. S. 12 (1917) , reversing 238 Fed.
668. The court there said, "The. seeming ab~solute confinement to the words
of an express contract indicated by the older cases like Paradine v. Jane has
been mitigated so far as to exclude from the risks of contracts for Conduct
(other than the transfer of fungibles like money), some, at least, which, if
they had been dealt with, it cannot be believed that the contractee would have
demanded or the contractor would have assumed. . .r .
3 Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. (igx)
A: C. xx§, gx8
C. Ann. Cas. 39o (Eng.); Tennants v. Wilson & Co. (197) A. C. 495, 1918

A. Ann. Cas. i (Eng.).
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taken. The earliest doctrine was an equitable one, that the defendant would be excused if performance was proved to bc impossible
unless it clearly appeared that he covenanted to perform regardless
of acts of God or any other contingency.26 Then came a few cases
-showing the influence of Paradine v. Janc-in which practically
the converse was stated, that if a person by his own contract promised to do something, he had to make good, notwithstanding impossibility, because he might have provided against it in his contract."'
It was very probably the severity of this rule that caused the Pennsylvania courts to announce the aforementioned exceptions. With
the breaking down of the strict
28 rule, the tide changed once again
in favor of the equitable view.
Courts in many jurisdictions and numerous writers have been
attempting to formulate a general rule that will include both the
rule of impossibility as a defense and all the established excep.tions. -9 The Pennsylvania courts have rather wisely avoided this,
being content to consider the circumstances of each case at it arises.
It probably will become necessary before long, however, to establish
some general boundary, in order that leniency shall not be too far
extended. Perhaps the most equitable statement would be that,
where the event which causes the impossibility is of such a character
that it cannot be reasonably supposed to have been in the contempla.tion of the contracting parties when the contract was made, and if
it had been contemplated, both the parties would have agreed that
its introduction into the contract, as a condition terminating the
obligation, was just, then upon its happening the resulting impossibility should be recognized as a proper defense. In the consideration of this subject, it would be well for the Pennsylvania and other
courts to keep ever before them that widely quoted but highly
Huling v. Craig, supra; Pollard v. Schafer, supra. See also the dictum

in Duncan v. Findlay, 6 S.& R. 235 (Pa.

1820).

"Hoy v. Holt, 91 Pa. 88 (1879). Although this case shows the strict
doctrine, it does not deal altogether with impossibility of performance, as it
is still possible to deliver up in good condition a mill destroyed by fire, merely
a greater expense being required to do so. Cope v. Dodd, 13 Pa. 33 (185o):

"Nor is the non-performance excused by inevitable accident or necessity,

even though this proceed from the act of of God." Hand v. Baynes, 4 Whart.
2o4 (Pa. x838), which on p. 214 practically quotes verbatim the rule from
Paradine v. Jane.
"Brown, Early & Co. v. Boom Co., 1o9 Pa. 57 (1885), where the
court went so far as to recognize that the promisor, if his words were to
be strictly interpreted, undertook an impossible task; Scully v. Kirkpatrick,

79 Pa. 324. (1875), one of a long line of Pennsylvania cases in which the
surety is discharged if the condition of a bond becomes impossible by the
act of God. Lovering v. Buck Mt. Coal Co., 54 Pa. 291 (1867). (This case is

referred to as standing for an equitable view in i5 Harv. L. Rev. 418.)
" I Col. L Rev. 529, criticized in 66 U. oF PA. LAw REv. 28, 32, and in IS
Harv. L.Rev. 418.

NOTES

efficacious phrase from the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in Kronpri.z.ssn Cecille,' that "business contracts mubt be
construed with business sense, as they -naturally would be understood
by intelligent men of affairs."
E.G.H.

aelARINERS*.Du
INFORMAL WVILLS- OF SOLDIERS AND
dccorum est pro patria mori. This ancient proverb doubtless has
been a source of comfort and satisfaction to countless hosts of
soldiers for many centuries. Since it has been felt, however, that
death for one's country cannot be a source of unalloyed pleasure to
the deceased, soldiers of many nations ' have ever been the objects
of peculiar indulgence in a number of ways-perhaps in no other
so notably as in the matter of making their wills. Two thousand
years ago Julius Casar first freed his milites from the necessity of
observing the strict forms of the Roman law of testaments.8 And
from early days the English and American people in their statutes
have extended to the defenders of the nation on land and sea similar
testamentary privileges with respect to their personal property.
Various reasons for the granting of this privilege have been
suggested. In one of his military orders, the Emperor Trajan
declared: "I have decided that the inexperience of my most excellent
and faithful fellow-soldiers should be indulged so that, no matter
how thy have executed their wills, their wishes should be respected."' 4
It has been said to be a special immunity "for honourable service
and perilous exertion" by the "gallant but unlettered and endangered
soldier." I This is only one of many special favors extended to
their soldiers and sailors by the Romans. They were moved, no
doubt, not only by a sense of gratitude, but also by the fact that the
average soldier or sailor was necessarily unskilled in the mysteries
of the law and during his term of service was generally unable to
obtain expert advice (inops consii)4.

Supra.
*This note was prepared after a study of the learned and thorough opinion of Gest, J., in Henninger's Estate, 3o Pa. Dist. Ct 413 (1gzx).
'Horace, Odes and Epodes, Bk. III, Ode IL
* Only the testamentary privileges granted by the Roman Law and the
Common and Statute Laws will be considered here. For a list of the
authorities of European. countries under the Civil law, see Drummond- v.
Parish, 3 Curt. 522 (Eng. 1843).
*Hunter, Roman Law, 3 ed. p. 771 (x897) ; Drummond v. Parish,, .upra.
"See Henninger's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. Ct 4t3 (1921).
'Browne, Civil Law, 2 ed., p. 29! (18o2).
'Ayliffe, Pandect of Roman Civil Law, Book IIr. Tit. XIV; In the
Goods of Sarah Hale, Ir. R. 2 K. B. ('g'S) 362; Smith's W311, 6 Phila. ro4
(Pa. 865).
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At early common law a valid written or oral (nuncupative) 5
will of chattels could be made by any male person at least fourteen
years of age. 8 No special privilege was granted to any particular
class since no strict testamentary form was required of any person.*
Any words, written or oral, were sufficient, just as long as the act
of writing or speaking and the testamentary intent of the deceased
were clearly proved. Two witnesses were required for an oral
will "0 and none for a written will. 21 It is uncertain whether at
early common law it was necessary for the validity of a nuncupative
will that it be made during the last illness in the face of death (in
1
extrcmis):." Subsequendy this probably was not'a requirement, 2
but as education "' began to spread among the people, the great
necessity for their toleration ceased, and it seems clear that they
were so limited in actual practice.1a

Loose nuncupative wills are necessarily a source of some danger. After one particularly flagrant attempt had been made to have
such a will established by gross fraud and perjury,"" the English
legislature felt compelled to take action, and the Statute of Frauds 27
was passed. By this act nuncupative wills of personalty were still
permitted, but only when hedged about with strict formalities; then
'And a testament nuncupative is . . . when the testator lieth
languishng for fear of sudden death, dareth not to stay the writing of his
testament; and therefore he prayeth his curate, and others his neighb6rs,
to bear witness of his last will, and declareth by word what his last will is":
Perkins, Conveyancing, 14 ed., 2o9 (757).
'Williams, Executors, ix ed., Pt. x, Bk. 2, C. 1, see. I (i2i); Deane v.
Littlefield, i Pick. 239 (Mass. iS2); Smallwood v. Berthouse, 2 Show. 204
(34 Car. 2).
'Henninger's Estate, supra.
' Henninger's Estate, supra.

' Swinburne, Wills, 7 ed., Pt. I, sec 1o 0793).
, Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators, $ ed., Vol. x, sec. 36r
( 915).
" See Johnston et aL. v. Glasscock, 2 Ala. 218 (i&4r), at p. 23, et seq.

""This Kind of Testament [nuncupative] is commonly made when the
Testator is very sick, weak, and past all Hope of Recovery. For it is re-

ceived for an Opinion amongst the ruder and more ignorant People, that if
a Man should be so wise as to make his Will in his Health, when he is strong
and of good Memory, having Time and Leisure and might ask Counsel of
the Learned, that then surely he should not live long after. And therefore, they defer it till such Time, when it were mote convenient to apply
themselves to the Disposing of their Souls, than of their Lands and Goods.
And in Consideration hereof it is, that Testaments are so much favored
which be made in such Times, namely, for that the Testator then cannot
conveniently stay to ask Counsel of such Points as be doubtful in Law":
Swinburne, Wills, supra, Pt x, sec. 12.
"Prince v. Hazelton, 20 Johns. 5o3, SIi (N. Y. 1822).

"Cole v. Mordaunt, 4 Ves. 196, note (1676).
s 29

Car. II C. 3, sec. 19-22.
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came the Wills Act.of I Victoria, providing that all wills must be
in writing and that every testator must be at least twenty-one years
of age.'$ As we shall see, however, important reservations were
made to apply to soldiers and sailors, both in the English and the
Pennsylvania Wills Acts. All of our Pennsylvania statutes 2 on
the subject permit nuncupative wills of personalty if executed with
certain formalities.

The exemption in favor of soldiers and sailors in the Statute
of Frauds is as follows:
"Sec. 23.-Provided always that, notwithstanding this act, any

soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman
being at sea, may dispose of his moveables, wages, 2' and personal
estate as he or they might have done before the making of this
act."#
The Act of I Victoria, and the Pennsylvania Wills Acts of

1o75,

1833 and 1917 contain like provisions in almost identical words,

A
number of the other States have closely similar enactments,22 The
Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act2 ' extends the privileges of memhers of the navy and the marines in England, and declares that
members of the Air Force are included in the word "soldier." In
addition it 'provides that a devise of real estate shall be "valid in any
case where the person making the disposition was of such age and
the disposition has been made in such manner and form that if the
disposition had been a disposition of personal estate made by such
it would have been valid." ' This is an excepperson . .
tionally generous provision. The other statutes exempted soldiers
and mariners from restrictions which were being placed Vpon all
other persons 23-this statute creates for them, even though they be
infants, the rare privilege of mking a valid oral devise of real
estate." '

"(1837) CA
Sections 9 and 7.
"The Wills Act of 17o5 (z Sm. Laws 33); of 1833 (P. L.249); and
of 1917 (P. L. 4o3); the Act of March I5,1832 (P. L 135).
" In England there now are special acts providing for the disposition by
His Majesty's seamen and marines of their wages and effects. They are
not dealt with in this note. See Williams, Executors, ix ed., Pt. i,Bk. 4, c. 3

(xgn).
-

I Stimson, Am. Stat. Law, Sec. 27oo.-

(=9 8) C. 58.
"Sec. 3. See In the Estate of Yates [gig] P. 93 (Eng.).
"It is pointed out by Gest, J., in Henninger's Estate, supra, that the
English soldiers and mariners were permitted to retait a privilege, while
the Roman soldiers had one created for them:
I Though not yet construed by a court with respect to infants, it seems
impossible of any other interpretation.
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The courts almost universally have been liberal in their interpretation of the exempting sections of the various statutes. Attempts have been made to have these sections construed as referring only to the manner of executing a will and, therefore, as
not exempting infant soldiers, and as not applying to revocations.
The attempts have met with failure in the stronger cases.26 The
result is that the status of the modern soldier and mariner in most
jurisdictions is almost identical with that of all persons before the
passage of the Statute of Frauds, with respect to both manner of
executing a will of personalty, and testamentary capacity. 2" Several restrictions, however, should be noted. They relate to revocation by subsequent marriage2 and power to appoint a guardian .2
in the English statutes the exemption is in favor of "any soldier being in actual military service, or any riariner or seaman
being at sea"; the Pennsylvania Acts make provision for "any
mariner being at sea, or any soldier being in actual military service." " The enactments in' most of the other states use closely
similar language. 31 " "Mariner" and "seaman" include not only members of the government's naval forces,'2 but also those of the merchant fleets.13 Similarly, "soldier"- is meant to apply to the military
forces of the East India Company " as well as to the regular army. '
The privilege belongs to all, irrespective of rank." It also appears
"In the Estate of Gossage [92I] P. i94 (Eng.); Henninger's Estate,
supra. Contra: a dictum in In re Werinher, L, R. i Ch. Div. (i918) 339.;
Goodell v. Pike, 40 Vt. 319 (1867). The fraud involved seems to have influenced the court strongly in the latter case. The Wills (Soldiers and
Sailors) Act of 1918 definitely establishes the privilege of English infant

soldiers and mariners.
Henninger's Estate, supra.
'Sec. 18 of the Act of I Victoria, providing that a subsequent marriage shall revoke a will, has been held to apply to soldiers and mariners:
In the Estate of Wardrop, [1917] P. 54 (Eng.).
"In the Estate of Tollemache [19x7] P. 246 (Eng.). The Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act of 1918, sec. 4, has since changed the law.
" The language of the Act of I705; supra, is slightly different
"or any mariner or person being at se7 (Sc. 7).

being

P See i Stimson, Am. Stat. Law, smstr.
"In the Goods of Hayes, 2 Curt. 338 (EMg. 1839).
"In the Goods of Paterson, 79 L T. . 123 (x88); F= parle Thompson, 4 Bradf. 154 (N. Y. 1856); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. 196 (1853).
'Gunner: In the Goodi of Prendergast, 5 N. of Cas. 92 (Eng. x846).

Surgeon: In the Goods of Donaldson, 2 Curt. 386 (184o).
'In re Stable [ipi9] P. 7 (Eng.); Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Me. 56T

0i866); Van Deuzer v. Gordon, 39 Vt. Irs (Y866 ; Botsford v. Krake, z
Abb; P. R. (N. S.) 112 (N. Y. 1866); Anderson v. Pryor, lo Smed. & 3.
62o (Miss. 1&48).
E"Mariner: In the Goods of M.Murdo, L R. r865, P. & D. 54. Cook:
Ex porte Thompson, supra. Master: In the Goods of Paterson, suprm.
Female typist on the Lusitania: In the Goods .of Sarah Hale, supra. Pursep:
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that one is none the less a mariner or seaman or soldier because she
Nor is it necessary that the deceased
happens to be a woman.3
had attained his majority; it is sufficient if he was at least fourteen
years of age.38 It is evident that this testamentary privilege is today
not dependent upon lack of sufficient education to execute a formal
instrument.3 0
The rule is for able-bodied, as well as for wounded and dying
soldiers °--indeed, in the great majority of the cases the soldier wa,
not even in the midst of immediate peril when he expressed -his testamentary wishes. 4' The problem with which the courts have had
the greatest difficulty is to determine just when one may be said
to be "in actual military service" or "at sea." The answer has been
4
clear when the soldier was actually on the field of battle, or en3
gaged in active operations4 or in winter quarters" or in a hospital
-in the war area."' On the other hand, while in barracks at homeI4
In the goods of Hayes, supra. Surgeon: In the goods of Saunders, L R.
7865, P. & D. i5.Naval Licutenant: In the Estate of Yates, 4upra; .Admiral.
In the Goods of Austen, 2 Rob. Ecc. 61x (1853). Private: In re Stable,
supra; Leathers v. Greenacre, supra. Cornet: In the Goods of Farquhar,
4 N. of Cas. 6si (Eng. 8.46). Captain: In the Goods of Godley, 41 Ir. L. T.
Major General: In the Goods of Churchill, 4 N. of Cas. 47
i6o (907).
(Eng. 1845). flurse: In the Estate of Ada Stanley, [1916] P. 192 (Enig.).
"As, in the army, the term 'soldier' embraces every grade, from the private
to the highest officer . . . so in the marine, the term 'mariner applies to
every person in the naval or mercantile service. . . .t Ex parte Thompson,
supra.
"In the Estate of Ada Stanley, supra;.In the Goods of Sarah Hale,
"Henninger's Estate, supra; In re 'Stable,, supra; Ift the Goods of Hiscock, [igoi] F. 78 (Eng.); In the Goods of M'Murdo, .upra; In the (oods
of Farquhar, supra. For the cases contra, see note A.
"In the Goods of May, 86 L. T. R. i2o (zgoi). "
Van Deuzer v. Gordon, .supra. There is a dictum in the 6ase of Ray
v. Wiley, iz Old. 720 (19o2), to the effect that the will must be made while
the testator is in extremis or in actual fear, contemplation or peril of
death.
See, among others, In the Estate of Yates, upra, and In re Stable,
supra.
' Henninger's Estate, supra; In the Goods of Churchill, . supra.
"In the Estate of Gossage, (i9g2] P. 194 (Eng.); In re Limond, . 1.
2 C. D. (19r5) o2o; Van Deuzer v. Gordon, supra; Botsford v. Krake,
supra; Anderson v. Pryor, supra.
"Leathers v. Greenacre, upra.
'Gould v. Safford's Estate, 39 Vt. 498 (z866). A letter written by a

soldier in a German prison camp was held not entitled to probate only

because the gifts of personal estate were dependent upon those of real
estate: Godman v. Godman, W. N. (9rgy 176 (affirmed in 1i92o] P. z93).
This case was decided under the Act of i Victoria.
'Drummond v. Parish, supra. The privilege of making informal wills
was granted by Julius Caesar first to all the Roman soldiers, and later to
sailors; but it was gradually restricted until finally onTy those e.xpeditionsiba "
occupati were thus privileged.
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or abroad 47 he is not "in actual military service," nor, a fortiori, is
one who is at home on a furlough and not under orders to report
shortly,4 3 nor one who is about to leave home to become a volunteer.'19 One who is under orders to join a force about to enter into
active operations, must take some "step" 5 0 toward obeying the orders
before he can become a privileged soldier-just how great a step
is by no means clear."' It seems imperative that a war be either in
progress 92 or threatened.6

In construing the phrase, "at sea," extreme liberality has been

shown.5 ' Wherever the tide ebbs and flows is said to be a part of
the sea;" and a mariner is at sea while on a voyage though his
ship is at anchor in a harbor, "' or while it is lying close to shore
awaiting a fair wind 'T or is in port making preparation to saiL"
Perhaps the greatest indulgence has been shown where the testamentary privilege of those "at sea" was granted to mariners during
furloughs on shore. 9
In the Goods of Hill, i Rob. Ecc. 276 (Eng. 1845); White v. Repton,
3 Curt. 81g (Eng. 1844). See also In the Goods of Phipps%2 Curt. 8 (Eng.
1840).
Smith's Will, supra. "It ['actual military service'] . . . never can
apply to the soldier who is in regular quarters or at his customary home om
leave of absence" (p. 107). But see Herbert v. Herbert, Dea & Sw. xo
(18ss).
'Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86 (i8f).
".This is the test laid down in In the Goods of Hiscoce supra. The
court in Gattward v. Knee, [1go2], P. 99 (Eng.) believes mobilization must
have begun. ". . . the commencement of the military service is the time
when the" mobilization takes place. In the same way it seems to me that
the actual military service does not cease until the full conclusion of the
operations": In re .imond, supra, at p. 246.
' Compare In re Stable, supra, and In the Goods of Gordon, 21 T. L. R.
653 (igos), .with In the Goods of Anderson [1916] P. 49 (Bug.).
" In the Goods of Hiscock, supra.
aThough the statutes do not so limit the privilege, it seems significant
that apparently no soldiers wills have been offered for probate except where
such was the state of affairs.
""The courts in England have gone to the uttermost verge of construction in extending this exception in behalf of seamen": Hubbard v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. 196, 200 (1853). The Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act of
x918 attempts to clarify the meaning of the phrase.
*Hubbard v. Hubbard, supra. On the high seas; Morrell v. Morrell, I
Hagg. Ecc. 51 (x827). On a Chinese river: In the Goods of Austen, supra.
A mariner on a gunboat on the Mississippi River during an .attack upon
Vicksburg was not "at sea": The Will of Gwin, Tuck. 44 (. Y. zr86€).
"In the Goods of Thompson, 5 Notes of Cas. 596 (1847).
WIn re Milligan, 2 Rob. Efcc. io (Eng.1849).
"In the Goods of Paterson, supra; Ex Porte Thompson, supra. But see
In the Goods of M'Murdo, supra.
I'On shore leave: In the Goods of Lay, 2 Curt 375 (Eug. ig4o). On
furlough but under orders to report shortly: In the Goods of Sarah Hale,

NOTES

Before .even a soldier's or a mariner's will may be admitted
to probate, the testamentary act and intent must, of course, be
satisfactorily proved. The deceased, however, need* onl" have intended to express his wishes in reference to the disposition of his
property after death. " It is of no consequence that he declared
his intention to draw a will subsequently:" The medium of the oral
or written expression is immaterial. 6 2 As is obvious from the admission of letters to probate, the writing need not be attested.
In an hour when the cry is being raised that the nation is forgetful of its soldiers and sailors and unappreciative of their services, it is of interest to note the peculiar indulgence with which the
law has treated them for centuries with respect to one of the most
sacred of human rights. The privilege which Julius Cxsar created
for his Lecions twenty centuries ago- is ours today.
C. Z. G., Jr.
-

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY IN SALES OF FOOD.--"No man
can justify selling corrupt victual, but an action on the case lies

against the seller, whether the victual was warranted to be good 6r
not." 1 This statement by Frowicke was relied upon by Blackstone
as authority for the rule that "in contracts for provisions, it is
supra. But in In the Estate of Thomas. In the Estate of Bowly, 62 Sol. .
784 (i9i8), the court took a strict attitude, refusing to allow to probate the
informal wills of two naval officers who were, respectively, lying wounded
in a hospital and on furlough in London in order to be married. The decision
of the Hale case was criticized. It was pointed out that Bowly's furlough
was "not in the course of any voyage" and "no portion of his duties of the sea"
(p. 784). Valid will of a wounded naval officer returning on a merchant
ship from active service: In the Goods of Saunders, supra. But a captain of a
merchant ship is not "at sea" while a passenger on another merchant ship;
the mariner must be employed as such at sea: Warren v. Harding, 2 R. I.
133 (1852).
' Rice v. Freeland, io9 S. E.
'Gattwaxd v. Knee (1902)

186 (Va. 1921); In re Stable, supra.
P. 99 (Eng.); In the Goods of May, 86
L. T. R. 1-20 (r9oi). He need not have intended the letter to constitute a.
will: Rice v. Freeland, supra. But see the criticism of this case in the Virginia Law Review (February, 192), p. 310.
' Oral wills: Henninger's Estate, supra; In re Stable, supra; Ex parte
Thompson, supra. Unattested written wtills: In the Goods of Lay, supra.
Attested by one person: In the Goods of Farquhar, supra. Letters: Rice v.
F-reeland, supra; In the Estate of Ada Stanley, supra; Leathers v. Greenacre, supra. Memorandum made at deceased's direction: Gould v. Safford's
Estate, supra. Entries in abstract book: In the Goods of Thompson, 5 Notes
of Cas. 596 (1847). 'Declaration node in compliance with military orders:
In the Goods of Scott, [i9o3] P. 243 (Eng.) Interrogatory: Hubbard v.
Hubbard, supra. In one case there was admitted to probate a paper not
written in the deceased's hand, without any signature (simply a mark not
stated to be that of the deceased) and with no available witesses to prove
its validity:
In the Goods of Prendergast, 5 Notes of Cas. 92 (Eng. x846).
1

Keilway. 9x.
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always implied that they are wholesome." 2 Since Blackstone's time
there have developed two distinct doctrines as to implied warranties
of quality in sales of food. The English courts, finding that the
early authorities were based on an- old statute long since repealed,
have refused to follow Blackstone's statement.' Treating sales of
food in the same manner as sales of other commodities, they imply
a warranty of wholesomeness only when the seller's judgment is
relied upon in selecting the food. The English rule is followed in
some of the American jurisdictions.4 However, the prevailing
American view, apart from statute, is that there is an implied warranty of wholesomeness in a sale of food to be consumed directly
in domestic uses.5 The rule is restricted, by the betti view, to sales
between retail dealers and consumers, 6 though there is authority for
applying it to. sales between dealers.7 The r'easons in support of
the American doctrine -differ. Some courts base the rule upon an
assumption that a dealer is better qualified to know the character of
the food he sells than is the purchaser. 8 On the other hand, the
Illinois courts place their decisions on the ground that public safety
demands such an implied warranty.'
'3

Comm. i65.

*Benjamin on Sales. (Ed. i8gi, pp. 6s8, 659); Burbey v. Bollett, 16 M.'&
.W.651 (1847). The statute is mentioned in Coke, 4 Inst. 261, as providing
that common dealers in victuals are liable to punishment for selling corrupt
victuals. Therefore, he says, they are responsible civilly to those customers
to whom they sell such victuals, for any special or particular injtiry by the
breach of the law which they thereby commit.
9 Hen, 6, 53,
The statute accbunts for the statement by Martyn in Y. ]3.
"the warranty is not to the purpose; for it is ordained that none shall sell
corrupt victuals." Also, it explains the statements of Tanfield, C. B. and
Altham, B., in Cro. Jac., 197, that "if a man sells corrupt victuals without
warranty, an action lies because it is against the commhonwealth" and of

Lord Hale in ist Fifzherbert's Natura Brevium, 94, that "there" is a diversity between selling corrupt wines as merchandise; for there an action on the

case does not lie without warranty; otherwise, if it be for a taverner or victualler, if it prejudice any."
' Goad v. Johnson, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.), 34o (187). Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 48f (igo8).
a24 Ruling Case Law 467;" Williston on Sales, (Ed. igog), sec. "242;
Hoover v. Peters, i8Mich. 5o (1869); Craft v. Parker, 96 Mich. 245, 55 N.
93 49 N F-2ro (i898); Race
W. 812 (1893); Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill.
v. Krumm, = N. Y. 410, ri8 N. E. 853 (19xi5; Askam v. Platt, 85 Conn.
448, 83 Atil. 528 (912).

'Hanser v. Hartse, %o Minn. 282, 72 N. W. 163 (x897); Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 9o S. W. 288 (igos).
'Cook v. Darling, i6o Mich. 475, 125 N. W. 411 (igio). A purchaser
does not have an action against the wholesaler. Tomlinson v. Armour, 74
N. J.L 274, 65 AtL 883 (x9o7).
'Hoover v. Peters, Note 5, sipra.
'Weideman v. Keller, Note 5, supra. "Public safety demands it, and
while the rule is harsh, the vendor has so many more facilities for ascertaining the soundness or unsoundness of the article offered for sale that it
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NXVhen the sale is of food in such a form that the dealer cannot
inspect it, as when sealed in tin cans,. there is a conflict of authority
as to whether the American nile should apply. Some courts hold
that it should not apply because, in the case of canned goods, the
presumption of a better opportunity for inspection by the seller does
not conform with the situation.' 0 The courts which place the rule
on the ground of public safety maintain that the public need for
such a warranty exists just as much in the case -of canned food as
in any other.'2
Inasmuch as the Uniform Sales Act has-adopted the English
view," making no distinction between sales of food and sales of
other commodities, it is of interest to note the liberality with which
the courts have applied the clause of the act relating to implied
warranties of fitness to sales of food. The act requires that it is
necessary to the existence of an implied warranty of fitness that the
buyer make known to the seller the particular purpose for which
the goods are required, and that it appear that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment. Nevertheless, the New York Court
of Appeal refused to reverse a case where the Court charged that
there is an implied warranty in every sale of food by a dealer for
is much safer to hold the vendor liable than it would be to compel the purchaser to assume the risk."
" Julian v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. 646, 38 N. Y. S. 1052 (x896), is an
example of this position, though the case is no longer the law in New York.
In this case involving a sale of salmon, the court said, "The doctrine of
implied warranty proceeds upon the assumption that the vendor has some
means of knowledge, opportunities for inspection, or sources of informa.tion with regard to the article which are not accessible or are unknowq to
the purchaser." But when a seller sells a can of food, "it is well. knoym
and must be known to both parties that he has not inspected it and that
the means of inspection were as much open to the purchaser as to tht
vendor."
In Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 11o Me. 1o5 (igiz), where th.
plaintiff Was 'poisoned by eating canned asparagus in defendant's dining cat
the court held there was no implied warranty on the sale of canned goods
"No knowledge of a perfect appearing can is possible. They cannot be
chemically analyzed every time they are used. Accordingly the reason for
the rule having ceased, a new rule should be applied to the sale and use of
canned goods that will mbre nearly harmonize with what is rational and
just.
n Chapman v. Roggerkamp, 182 II. App. i17 (1913Y; Sloan V. Woolworth Co., 193 Ill. App. 62o (i915).

"Sec. i5 (i). "Where the" buyer, expressly or by jmplication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
While the Sales Act does not distinguish between sales *of food and
other sales, it is evident that in the sale of' food it would not be necessary
for the buyer to make known to the seller the purpose for which the goods
are required. The nature of the article purchased implies its purpose.
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immediate human consumption."3 Its reason was that there is such
an implied warranty under the Sales Act in the ordinary sale of food
unless it appears that the buyer examines the goods. The case of
a sale of canned goods has been treated even more liberally. Both
the English courts under their similar act I" and the Massachusetts
Supreme Court 15 found that in such a case the buyer relies upon
the seller's judgment. Surely the seller buying the goods in a sealed
form from a wholesaler cannot inspect a can; and while he' may
choose a reliable wholesaler, he cannot be said to use judgment in
Yet the
selecting one can from another for an individual sale.
Massachusetts court says: "There arises inevitably the implication
that the buyer was relying, because from the character of the transaction he was bound to rely, upon the skill of the seller in selecting
the can which was offered to him."
A recent New York case slightly extends the above decisions."
The plaintiff, a small child, was poisoned by drinking milk bought
by its mother from a distributor. The milk was certified as pure
by a milk commission. The Court held that there was an implied
warranty that the milk was fit for food. The facts that the seller
' Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (x918). Here there
was a sale of pork. The court said, "Where all that appears is the ordin,,ry transaction between dealer and customer, a charge to the jury that on
every sale of food by a dealer for immediate human consumptioni there is
an implied warranty of its wholesomeness, while inaccurate is harmless."
" The English Sales of Goods Act is different from the American Sales
Act in this respect, that after the word judgment in the latter Act (se
note 12) are found the words "and the goods are of a description which it
is in the course of the seller's business to supply." This difference is immaterial in these cases.
The case of Frost v. Dairy Co. (i9o5), I K. B. 6o8, involved the sale
of milk, and that of Jackson v. Watson & Sons (199), 2 K. B. x93, had to
do with the sale of a can of salmon. They were ordinary sales with no
evidence of any express reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment, yet
the court held, in each case, that there was an implied Warranty of fitness
under the act.
"Ward v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 9o, 12o N. .
Here there was an ordinary sale of a can of beans, without
225 (i9z8).
evidence of reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment beyond the
former asking for a can of beans. The plaintiff broke a tooth on a pebble
found in the beans. It was held that the seller impliedly warranted that
the beans were fit for food. "In the absence of an express statement to
the contrary, this must be regarded as a necessary inference from the relation of the parties."
"In the Rinaldi case, note 13, supra, the court said, "We do not pass
upon the quesion as to whether it applies to a sale in the original package
bought by the vendor from others. In such circumstances it is possible that
the inference of reliance would not be properly deduced from the purchase alone."
'Lieberman v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 191 N. Y. S. 593
(19=).
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was a mere distributor and that the milk was certified might possibly
have distinguished the case from its predecessors, yet the Court held
that the laiter point made no difference and did not touch the former.
It would seem that the law is reverting to Blackstone's rule through
the adoption of the very doctrine that discredited it.
L. H. McK.
ILLECALITY OF F.MPLOYN1ENT AS
AFFECTING AGREEMENTS
LNDER TIE
NVORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IN PENNSYLVANIA.-

It has been determined in Pennsylvania that the Workmen's Cornpensation Act of 1915

1

does not bar an action at common law

against an employer by a minor employee whose employment was
illegal.' A similar rule has been established in other States whose
workmen's compensation statutes are similar to that of Pennsylvania." But the recent case of Delany v. The PhiladelpHia & Reading Coal and Iron Co.,' creates an important modification of this.
rule. In that case the plaintiff, a minor under the age of sixteen,
suffered injuries in the course of his employment which was of a
character prohibited by statute.. The plaintiff, with- the consent of
his father and next friend, then made an agreement with defendant,
his employer, in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act; and later, with like consent, entered into a supplemental agreement with defendant under the amendatory Act of
i919.6 Under these agreements plaintiff received payments from
defendant for fourteen months. He then refused to accept further
payments, and brought suit to recover damages for the injuries he
had sustained. No re-payment or tender of the moneys theretofore
received was made. It was held, reversing the decision of the trial
Court, that the plaintiff was bound by his agreements and could not
maintain the action.
The cases in which Workmen's Compensation Acts have been
held not to limit the liability of the employer have been those in
which the employers sought to compel the wrongfully employed
minor to proceed under the statutes, and have been decided on the
ground that the provisions of the statutes could not have become
part of a contract binding on the minor because the original contract
of employment was illegal.7 It was said by the Supreme Court of
Act of June 2, x915, P. L 73&'Lincoln v. National Tube Co., 268 Pa. 5o4, 112 At. 73 (i92o).
'Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 IN. J. L. 2oi, 98 AtL. 306
(i9i6); Secdlich v. Harris-Emery Co., 184 Ia. io25, i69 N. *W. 325

(igi8).

'272 Pa. -

(1922).

'Act of May 13, 1915, P. L 28.
'Act of June 26, i919, P. L. 642.

'Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., note 3, .supra..
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Iowa:' "The employment of a child under the prescribed minimum
age being forbidden, the child cannot lawfully consent to take employment under the statute, nor can the employer, by such void contract. limit his liability for injury to such child to the compensation
fixed by the act, to which it was incapable of giving consent." The
right of the employee to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the right of his employer to have his liability
limited by such Act is thus considered fundamentally a matter of
contract inseparable from the contract of employment.
But in the instant case the wrongfully employed minor had
elected to proceed under the original Act and had accepted relief
under it and the amendatory Act of 1919. The latter Act " provides
that "All agreements for compensation and all supplemental agreements for the modification. suspension, reinstatement or termination
thereof, and all receipts executed by any injured employee of whatshall be 'alid, and binding, unless modified or
ever age . .
set aside" for reasons not here applicable. It was on this provision
of the amendatory act and the circumstance of plaintiff's voluntary
acceptance of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as opposed to an attempted imposition of them upon him, that the
decision of the instant case was based. Although the terms of the
Workmen's Compensation Act are broad enough to include the case
of injury to one wrongfully employed,' 0 the conclusion in the case
of Lincoln v. Natiorial Tube Co., in which the Act was held inapplicable, was reached on the ground that to give it effect would be
to nullify the penal statute,'; enacted during the same session of the
legislature, by which the employment of minors in certain classes
of work was prohibited. But the amendatory Act is not subject to
the same considerations as to legislative intent, and thus its provision expressly giving validity to the contract which the plaintiff
in the instant case undertook to repudiate may be given full effect.
It thus may be considered as settled in Pennsylvania that while
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be imposed upon an illegally employed minor against his will, yet such an
employee may voluntarily bind himself under the amendatory act
to accept such provisions, and if he do, will not thereafter be heard
to deny their applicability. This modification of the rule seems
warranted not only on the grounds of good conscience, but also as
making it impossible for a statute, " designed for the protection of
minors, to become, at the instance of the unscrupulous, an instrument of fraud.
P.P.
0Secklich v. Harris-Emery Co., note 3. supra.
'Sec. 4o7, P. L. 66o.
" Se. io4, P. L 736.
" Note 5,supra.
• Note 5,supra.

NOTES
TirE ADMISSIILITY IN EVIDEXCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL CIRCU'IST.\NCE- IN ACTIONS FOR LInEL OR SLANDER.-The

measure of damages in actions for libel or slander has been a source
of considerable conflict in our law. The rule permitting exemplary
as well as compensatory damages in these cases has been attacked.
though apparently with little success, by 'Mr. Greenleaf and others.,
Now it seems. that the rule permitting evidence of the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant to be introduced in libel or slander
suits for the purpose of enhancing or mitigating the damages, is
under fire. In fact the tendency of some courts. is to repudiate it
entirely.
This tendency is shown by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Iowa.' The action was for slander. The lower court permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the reputed wealth of
the defendant. Upon appeal the defendant contended that if proof
of wealth is admissible at all, it should be limited to acttliil aid not
reputed wealth. The court refused to admit evidence of either the
reputed or actual wealth of the defendant, and repudiated the rule,
which, it stated, had long been recognized in that state.3 The ground
for the decision was that "if the plaintiff is permitted to establish
the reputed wealth of the defendant, the latter has the right to meet
such evidence by proving his reputed wealth to be otherwise than as
claimed bv the plaintiff, and the jury would be led into a collateral
matter whiolly foreign to the issue in the case and, as we view it, not
germane to its proper determination." This conclusion is supported
by a few scattered cases.
According to the great weight of autlorit, however, the plaintiff in such an action is entitled to show the financial condition of
the defendant. An analysis of the situation will show that thig
view is founded on both logic and expediency. First, insofar as
compensatory damages are concerned, the evidence ought to be admitted. The extent of injury suffered by the plaintiff, hence the
amount of compensatory damages to be awarded, will unquestionably
be largely dependent upon the rank and influence of the defendant
'Sedgwick on Damages,-Sec. 353-354..
'Sclar v. Resnick, x85 N. W. 273 (Iowa 1921).
'Hahn v. Lumpa, 158 Iowa 56o. 138 N. W. 492 (1913); Herzman v.
88o); Karney v. Paitley, 13 Iowa
Oberfelder, 54 Iowa 83, 6 N. W. 8x
89 (1862).
"King v. Sassaman, 64 S. W. 937 (Tex. igoz); Nailor v. Pouder, i Marv.
(Del.) 4o8, 41 Atl. 88 (1895); Enos v; Enos, 58 Hun 45, Ir X. Y. S. 415
(189).
'Downs v. Cassidy, 47 Mont. 47t, z33 Pac. io6 (1913); Slaughter v.
Johnson, ,8i IlL. App. 693 (1913) ; Kidder v. Bacon, 74 Vt. 263, 52 At. 322
(902); Steen v. Friend, xx Ohio Cir. Dec. 23^1, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 459 (go1);
McAlnont v. McClelland, 14 Serg. & R. 259 (Pa. 1828); Note Arm. Cas.
i915 B, xzs9.
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in the community in which he lives. If he occupies a high and influential position, his words will have a much more serious effect
than if he were of little importance in the community. In theory a
man's prestige and reputation for veracity ought not to depend upon
the reputed or actual size of his pocketbook; nevertheless every
thinking man must realize that in a modern American world wealth
is in fact a powerful factor in bringing rank and influence. While
influence is by no means necessarily dependent upon the possession
of wealth, yet it would seem that, in general, there is a direct relati-m between them, and that a man's financial standing is one element to be considered in ascertaining his social position.8 Inasmuch
as position or prestige is a matter of reputation, it would seem
proper in determining it to consider a man's reputed wealth rather.
than his actual wealth. 7 We may conclude, therefore, that in suits
for libel or slander the reputed financial standing of the defendants
is relevant as tending to show his influence, and consequently the
extent of injury and amount of compensatory damages due to the
plaintiff.
When it appears that the defendant acted maiciously in publishing the libel, or uttering the slander, practically all courts permit
the jury to award exemplary or punitive damages. 9 Here evidence
of the defendant's wealth seems not only relevant but an essential
fact upon which to base the punitive award. A money verdict which
would be extremely punitive to a defendant of small or moderate
means might easily be light and trivial to a defendant of large financial resources. The vengeance of the law would scarcely be appreciated, and he could afford to pay and slander still. It is obvious that
in this case the defendant's capacity to pay, and hence the extent of
punishment, depends not on his reputed, but on his actual wealth.
Itwould seem, therefore, that on the question of exemplary damages
the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant at the time of the
trial become material and relevant, and may be considered by the
jury in determining the amount of their verdict.
Thus we see that'the true rule must admit evidence of the defendant's reputed wealth in measuring compensatory damages, and
*This is peculiar neither to modem times nor to America.

Plutarch

in his Life of Nicias says that Lamachus was a brave and honest man, but
so poor that when appointed general he used to account for his very clothes
out of public funds. The author then adds "On the contrary; Nicias, as on
other accounts, so, also, because of his wealth and station, was very much
thought of."-Plutarch's Lives, VoL IIL

'McCloy v. Vaughan, 185 Mich. 189 , I5 N. V. 667 (1915); Standwood

v. Whitmore, 63 Me. z9 (1874).

'The better view is that the evidence should relate to the defendant's reputed wealth at the time of the publication of the libel or the utterance of
the slander. Geringer v. Norak, x17 Ill. App. i6o (1904); Rea v. Harrington, 58 Vt. 181, 2 AtL. 475 (x886).

'Sedgwick on Damages, sec. 377.

NOTES

evidence of the defendant's actual wealth in measuring exemplary
Nor should the fact that the defendant is a corporation
damages."
render evidence as to its wealth inadmissible. ""
If this rule is supported both by authority and reason, why was
it repudiated by the iowa court in the instant case? The main reason is that if the evidence is admitted there is, the Court says, a
danger of the jury being led into "the 'bewildering labyrinths of
such collateral matter." But this danger might be removed by making it the duty of Ehe trial court by proper cautions to guard against
undue weight being given such evidence, and thus the benefits of the
rule would be retained. Some courts apply the rule in this restricted
manner.' 2 Again the court in the principal case asks "Is the utterance of a man worth $5oooo to be regarded as twice as damaging
as that of a man worth only $25,ooo? And if the slanderer is insolvent, does it follow that no damages flow from his utterances?"
In answer to these questions it need only be said that the rule contended for would support no such arbitrary propositions. The utterances of a man carry great or little weight, not because he is rich
or poor, but because he is a man of great or little influence; and
one of a number of elements which indicate the extent of his influence is his wealth or poverty. Finally it is said that "the rule originated at a time when wealth was by no means as universally distributed as it is at the present time." Apparently the court means
that with a more equal distribution of wealth existing today', wealth
is no longer indicative of influence and standing. Would that the
court's contention were true, but it is not, for people are rich or
poor only by comparison; and relatively speaking, there is the same,
difference in wealth that there was when the rule originated. It
seems certain that the glitter of gold has the same magnetic effect
upon the popular mind today as it did in days gone by. If this is so
then the reason for the rule is equally as cogent as heretofore, and
the advantage to be gained from admitting the evidence seems to
far outweigh the possible risk of shifting the field of battle to a
collateral 'matter.
A.B. V;B.
WHEN REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF STATE COURTS MAY BE HAD
IN

THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT BY WRIT OF ERROR OR'

it proper to bring an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court by writ of error or certiorari, when it is
desired to review the decision of a state court passing on the

CERTIoRARI.-When is

validity of a state statute alleged to be repugnant to the ConstituBahrey v. Poniatishin, 112 Atl. 481 (N. J. 7921).
'Buckeye Cotton Co. v. Sloane, 250 Fed. 712 (Tenn. x918) ; Cotton Lum"Randall v. Evening News Assn.. 97 Mich. 136, 56 N. W. 361 .(893).
ber Co. v. La Crosse Lumber Co., 200 Mo. App. 7, 204-S. W. 957 (1918).
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tion and laws of the United States? This question has been a
puzzling one to litigants since the recent amendment to the Federal
judicial code,' with the result that a large number of causes have
been der.ied review.' In the recent case of Dahnke-Walker Milling
Company v. Bondurant, the general proposition was again considered, and while the court failed to lay down any broad general rule
applicable to all cases, it made it apparent that a writ of error will
be granted in cases where the method of review previously had been
considered doubtful.
The Walker Milling Company, a Tennessee corporation, sued
Dondurant in Kentucky for breach of contract. By the agreement,
which was made in Kentucky, grain was to have been delivered on
board the cars of a common carrier, in the latter State, for immediate shipment to the plaintiff. Bondurant interposed as a defence
the failure of the milling company to comply with a Kentucky
statute" prescribing the conditions on which foreign corporations
might do business in the State, and therefore, alleged that the contract was unenforceable. To this, the plaintiff replied that the only
business done by it in Kentucky was the purchasing of grain for
immediate shipment to its mills, a transaction in interstate commerce,
and, as to it, the Kentucky statute, whose application was invoked
by Bondurant, was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution and invalid. But the Kentucky Court of Appeals 5 applied
the statute, on the theory that since the contract was made in
Kentucky, related to property then in that State, and was to have
been wholly performed within its borders, the affair was strictly
intrastate in its nature. The Milling Company then sued out a writ
'Judicial code, par. 237, as amended by the Act of Sept. 6, 1g16 (U. S.

St. at L, 726, c. 448, par. 27).
Causes which must be reviewed by writ of error include "any suit-where
is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under any state, on the .ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of
their validity."
Causes which must be reviewed by writ of certiorari include "any
cause . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or
an authority, exercised under any state, on the ground of their being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the
decision is against their validity"; and "any cause-where any title, right,
privilege or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or
statute of, or commission held, or authority exercised, under the United
States, and the decision is either in favor of or against the title, right,
privilege or immunity especially set up or claimed by either party, under
such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission or authority.
'An excellent example of this is the case of Erie R. Co. v. Hamilton,
248 U. S.369, 63 L. ed. 3o7 (i919).
'42 Sup. Ct. zo6 (U. S. x92i).
'Ky. Stat. 1915, Par.

571.

' 175 Ky. 74, 195 S. W. 139 (1917).
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of error to the United States Supreme Court; *whereupon Bondurant
challenged the jurisdiction of that body, his contention being that
the validity of the Kentucky statute had not been drawn in question,
and that therefore, a review could only be had by certiorari.
This view the Supreme Court refused to follow, and it held
that the application and enforcement of the Kentucky statute as to
the transaction in question, against the insistence of the plaintiff
company, was an affirmation of its validity when so applied, and
that, therefore, its validity was drawn in question. "That the statute
was not claimed to be invalid in toto and for ever)' purpose does not
matter," said .Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the court.
"A statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts, and yet
valid as applied to another." 7 The appeal was declared to be
rightly brought on writ of error, and the judgment of the Kentucky
court was reversed.
Prior to 1916, judgments and decrees of State courts could only
be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of error.$ They were
not allowed as a matter of right,9 and would be denied if no federal
question were involved. But the steady increase in the business of
the court made it necessaiy that its appellate jurisdiction be limited. 0
It was therefore the intention of Congress, in adopting the amendment to the judicial code, to restrict the review of fedel-al questions
to cases where the public interest appearted to demand it. To this
end, parties were allowed review as of right only where the validity
of a State statute or authority had been drawn in question, because
the decision of such a question is usually a matter of general interest.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Brandeis contended that the validity of the Kentucky statute had not actually been
drawn in question, but that a confessedly valid statute had merely
been misapplied in a particular instance, so as to violate a constitutional guaranty; and that this was only a matter of private interest,
the review of which Congress intended to be had by writ of
certiorariin the discretion of the court.
In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the statute had
been in force in Kentucky since 1903, and had been construed not
to affect transactions in interstate commerce." In the case of Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Hopkins," - it was held that the validity of a
' McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. io2, 43 L ed. 382 (1898).
'Kansas City R. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325, 58 L. ed. 983 (19r4).
1U. S. R. S., par. 709 (Act of 1867), 14 Stat. 385, c. 28, par. 2.
*Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L ed. 8o (1887).

" See Report in Judiciary Committee, House Doc. No. 794, 64th Congress, ist Session, House Rep., vol. 3.
"Louisville Trust Co. v. Bayer Co., 166 Ky. 744, 179 S. W. 1034
(915); Com. v. Hogan, M. & T. Co., 25 .Ky. L Rep..4i, 74 S. W. 737

(903).
" 130 U. S.
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statute is drawn in question "whenever the power to enact it, as it is
by its terms, or is made to read by construction, is fairly open to
denial and denied." But in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
the power of the Kentucky Legislature to enact the statute, as construed, was not actually denied. The single point at issue was
whether or not the transaction was one of interstate or intrastate
commerce, i. e., whether the valid statute bad been so applied-not
construed-as to deny to the plaintiff a privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution.
It must be confessed that there is merit in this contention. If
the intention of Congress was to relieve an overburdened court, it
would seem that the court had evinced a contrary desire. Since the
Amendment of 1916, certiorarihas been the proper method of reviewing proceedings under State Workmen's Compensation Acts or
State Employers' Liability Acts, where the question of the carrier's
liability often depends upon the other question, viz., whether, at the
time of the accident, the employ6 was engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce. This was decided in the case of Southern Pacific
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 3 where the State court held
that the employ6 was engaged in intrastate commerce and applied
the State Compensation Act. But the company petitioned for a writ
of certiorari,conceding the validity of the statute, but alleging that
the finding of the State court was against a "right, privilege, or immunity" claimed under the Constitution. Ctiriously enough, the
respondent irgued that the appeal should have been on a writ of
error. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower
court, holding that the employ6 was engaged in interstate commerce,
and that certiorariwas the proper method of review. But it would
seem to follow, from the rule adopted in the principal case, that the
carrier could in all such compensation cases, obtain a review on a
writ of error by simply claiming that the State statute is invalid
under the commerce clause, if so construed as to apply to the special
facts of the case. The situation would be analogous in cases involving State taxation,1"' and in suits in State courts against foreign
corporations.15
3251

U. S. 25A 64 L ed. 258 (192o).

"In Dana v. Dana, 250 U. S. 22o, 63 L ed. 947 (919), it was argued
by the appellant that the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had erred in
sustaining an assessment tax because it was imposed on real property outside of the state. The Supreme Court held that whether or not the specific
thing taxed was property within or without the state which levied the tax was
a question which could only be reviewed by certiorari, since the validity of
the tax was not drawn in question. The appellants contention was that the
assessment took his property without due process of law.
' In Philadelphia & R. Coal & I. Co. v. Gilbert, 245 U. S. 162, 62 L ed.
221 (1917), there was a suit in New York State against appellants, a Pennsyhiania corporation, the question being presented whether or not the court
had jurisdiction. This depended on the other question whether or not tne

NOTES

In the case of Ireland v. Woods,' " which was one of the first
cases in which the amendment was considered, it was stated that
a writ of error is allowed as of right, even in cases within the provision of the statute, only where the federal question involved is a
real and substantial one, and an open one in the court. If it be
assumed that the application of the Kentucky statute to the contract
in the principal case is a question answering this description, it is
difficult to distinguish that case from one involving the application
of a State Compensation Act to an employ' in interstate commerce.
It is submitted that a possible distinction between th.e two cases
might be as follows: In the principal case the statute was actually
invalid qua the milling company; while in the compensation case,
the State act was not invalid, but merely had been rendered inoperative by Congress occupying the entire field.
It is impossible to reconcile the cases. It has been suggested
by Mfr. Justice Brandeis that the right of review by writ of error is
now liable to depend, in a large class of cases, not upon the nature
of the constitutional question involved, but upon the skill of counsel
in claiming that a State statute is invalid, if so construed as to
"apply" to a given set of facts. W'-ether or not there is any reasonable basis for this apprehension is a question which will have to
await the future decisions of the court.
R.P.G.L.
corporation was doing business within the state, and had expressly 'or impliedly consented to be sued therein.

The appellants contended that the

validity of the N. Y. statute, upon which the service and jurisdiction in the
N. Y. court depended, was drawn in question. But the United States Supreme Court held that the only things that were drawn in question were
the validity of the service and the power of the court, and that review
could only be had on a writ of certiorari.
"2246 U. S. 323, 62 L ed. 745 (1gx8).

